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OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF WILLS
THOMAS A. BYRNE
DEFINITION, NATURE AND KINDS OF WILLS
I. A will is a gratuitous disposition by a competent testator to a com-
petent donee, of property or rights in property over which the
testator has the legal right of disposition, such disposition to take
effect upon the death of the testator.1
II. Kinds of wills.
A. Wills may be either written or oral.
B. An oral will is called a nuncupative will.2
i. An oral will may be used only to dispose of personal estate and
may not be used to dispose of real estate nor the income of real
estate yet to accrue.
2. In Wisconsin a nuncupative will may dispose of personal estate
up to $15o. After the amount exceeds $i5o the statute must
be followed strictly. It provides that the testator must have
had testamentary intent, must have been in extremis, and the
will must have been made in the last abode of the testator, or
where he resided for ten days preceding the making of the
will, or in the place where the testator was taken sick when
away from home and died before his or her return. The
testator, must, at the time of the making of the will, have
called upon the three necessary witnesses or some of them
to witness that this was his last will and testament.
3. These rules do not apply to soldiers, sailors and marines.
4. A nuncupative will may not be proved for 14 days after death
of the testator, nor may it be proved after six months of the
speaking of the words unless reduced to writing within six
days after the speaking of the words.
C. Written wills.
i. A holographic will is one made entirely in the handwriting of
the testator.3
a. The writing must be altogether in the testator's hand; the use
of a printed form, or typewriting, or letter heads, to com-
pose the whole or any part of the will renders it no longer
holographic.'
'Rood on Wills, sec. 46; Costigat's Cases, i; ioi Ore. 305, 22 A.L.R. 428.
Sec. 2292 Wis. Stats. As to proof of, see Wis. Stats. 2293; 26 L.R.A.N.S.
1145.
'2282 and 2283 Wis Stats.; L.R.A. I917F; 4 A.L.R. 727.
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b. A holographic will is not good if made in Wisconsin, but if
it is made outside of the state, and is good where made or
where testator is domiciled it will be good.in Wisconsin.8
2. Valid wills may be made even if they contain conditions. These
wills are called conditional wills. The failure of the condition
to be fulfilled will cause the will to fail of operation. If it is
not clear that the condition was incorporated in the will the
instrument must operate. 4
3. There is no doubt of the validity of alternative wills providing
for one disposition in one event and another disposition in an-
other event.5
4. A joint will is one made and signed by two or more persons dis-
posing of property held jointly.
5. Joint and mutual wills are those made by two persons disposing
of property to each other.
6. Reciprocal wills are separate instruments signed separately by
two persons and disposing of property to each other.
NOTE. These wills are revocable during the life of the testators in
the same manner as are other wills.
D. Contracts to make wills.
i. A contract to make a will is not a will since it implies a con-
sideration, whereas a will is a purely voluntary conveyance for
which a consideration is not necessary.6
2. Where people agree, for a valid consideration, to make a will,
or to make a will in a particular way, this is a binding contract
which will be held good against the estate.8
3. All the requisites of a good contract must be present.
4. Where a will was made in conformity with such a contract and
was later revoked the contract still remains enforceable.
5. An agreement without consideration to make a will is void un-
less it is under seal.
8
CAPACITY TO MAKE A WILL
I. In general any natural person of full age and sound mind who is not
under constraint and is possessed of devisable property may make
a will."
' go Mass. 192, 193 U.S. 4H!.
Rood, sec. 63.
'Rood, sec. 51-54. See also Murtha v. Donohoo, 149 Wis. 481, where it was
held that past services were sufficient to support a promise to provide compensa-
tion by will. As to quantum meruit on promise to bequeath, see 41 L.R.A.N.S
246.
'a Rood, sec. 103-105.
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II. The testamentary capacity of the testator over personality is gov-
erned by the law of the domicile of the testator, and the testa-
mentary capacity of the testator of real property is governed by the
law of the situs of the land.lb
III. In general the competency of the testator is to be determined as
of the date of the execution or republication of the will, not as of
the date of its making or drawing.c
IV. Infancy.
A. At common law an infant of eighteen could make a valid will of
personalty, but no infant could devise real estate.a" In the
ecclesiastical courts bequests of personal estate could be probated
if the male testator was fourteen or the female testator was
twelve.3a This seems to have been affirmed in the courts of com-
mon law jurisdiction and also in courts of equity.'a




A. At common law a married woman could not devise real estate,
nor could she dispose of her chattels by will without the consent
of her husband.
5a
B. In Wisconsin a married woman of eighteen may dispose of both
realty and personalty by will. 4a This is construed to mean that
at the time of the making of the will she must be married, not
widowed or divorced.
VI. Alienage.
A. At common law an alien friend could make an indefeasible will
of personalty, 8 and the property of an alien enemy domiciled
within the country was equally protected. The wills of alien
enemies domiciled elsewhere were less secure due to the liability
of the property to be confiscated after the declaration of war.7
B. An alien may acquire lands by purchase but not by descent; and
there is no distinction, whether the purchase be by grant or by
devise.8
lb 40 Cyc. 997 and cases cited.
1
C 40 Cyc. o98 and cases cited.
'a Co. Lit. 89b, note 83.
i Underhill on Wills, sec. 120.
'a Wis. Stats. 2277 and 2281.
"a 43 N.J. Eq. 577.
'a Rood, sec. 139; I B1. Comm. 372.
'The William Bagaley, 72 U.S. 377.
' Harley v. The State, 40 Ala. 689.
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C. As aliens have no inheritable blood their lands would escheat to
the sovereign without office found if they should die intestate;
but the will of the alien, whether he be friend or enemy, passes
to his devisee all the estate the alien had; and the title of the
devisee can be divested only in a proceeding in the name and
behalf of the stateY
D. In Wisconsin no distinction may ever be made between resident
aliens and citizens in the possession, enjoyment and descent of
property.10
VII. Conviction for crime.
A. At common law the wills of traitors, felons, suicides and the like
were of no avail, not for want of testamentary capacity, but for
the mere lack of anything to bequeath. 1
B. In the United States no state may pass any bill of attainder.1 2
No bill of attainder against the United States shall work cor-




C. In Wisconsin no conviction shall work corruption of blood or for-
feiture of estate.15.
VIII. Mental capacity.
A. All forms and manifestations of mental unsoundness, whether
temporary or permanent, are generally of two classes. The
first of these classes is deficiency of power such as mental weak-
ness, lack of vigor, imbecility, idiocy or dementia. The second
of these classes occurs where a once strong and normal mind
has become deranged, as in the cases of erratic, distorted, de-
lirious or insane mental action.'8
B. Deficiency of power.
i. Test of mental strength required to make a will. By saying
that the testator must have a sound mind is not meant that he
must have a fully efficient mind, nor one able to contract or
conduct business, but that he must have sufficient mental
power and active memory to know his property, the natural
'Rood, sec. 140; 11. U.S. 603.
" Wis. Stats., sec. 2277 and 228i; Wis. Cons. I, 15.
"Rood, sec. 141; Shep. Touchstone, 404.
2U.S. Const. I, io.
"U.S. Const. III, 3.
" Wallach v. Van Riskirk, 92 U.S. 202; II. Cent. Ry. v. Bosworth, 133 U.S.
92.
"Wis. Cons. I, 12.
See Rood, secs. IO8-I37, inc.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
objects of his bounty, and be able, without prompting, to make
a rational disposition as to each.
1 7
2. By senile dementia is meant the weakening of the mind due to
old age. To constitute senile dementia there must be such a
failure of the mind as to deprive the testator of intelligent
mental action. Despite the weakened capacities, if the testa-
mentary act be understood and appreciated, and the transaction
be understood, the capacity to make a will remainsY.1a
3. The fact that the testator has been deaf, dumb, or blind, even
from birth, raises no presumption of mental weakness. The
existence of these defects goes only to the ability of the tes-
tator to make his wishes known and to signify that he under-
stands the contents of the will and approves of them. If it
can be shown that he fully understood and approved, his will
should be entitled to probate.17b
C. Mental derangement.
i. In general, derangement of a man's mentality may be shown by
referring to his actions, desires, aversions, conduct and
beliefs. 16
2. The thoughts, actions and aversions which are relied upon to
prove mental derangement or insanity must not be compared
with any hard and fast standard of propriety but must be com-
pared with the conduct of the same person when he was sane.",
3. Any prolonged departure from the usual state of a man's feel-
ings and tastes when in a normal state, when the peculiarities
cannot be explained by the habits, environment, temperament
and education of the party, are evidences of mental derange-
ment; and the inference of insanity from them becomes
stronger as the peculiarities appear more unnatural.' 9
4. An unexplained hatred for the offspring who would be the
natural objects of the testator's bounty may be the basis of a
finding of insanity,20 but there is no doubt that if the testator
is found sane the will is valid no matter how unjust and un-
natural it may be.'
5. "The fact that a man is affected with insanity, or labors under
a delusion, believes in witchcraft, clairvoyance, spiritual in-
'Rood, sec. iii; In. re Butler, iio Wis. 70.
a See note 9, Marquette Law Review, 206.
"b See note 9, Marquette Law Review, 206.
' Rood 1i9.
"'Miller v. White, 5 Redf. Sur. (N.Y.) 320.
'Ann. Cas. 1917E, 130-132.
2"i L.R.A. i6I.
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fluences, pre-sentiments of the occurrence of future events,
dreams, mind reading, and so forth, will not affect the validity
of the will on the ground of insanity. Manifestly, a man's
belief can never be made the test of insanity."
22
6. An insane delusion is a belief in something extravagant or im-
possible in the proper order of things, or impossible under the
circumstances surrounding the affected person, which belief
refuses to give way to evidence or reason.
23
7. The error of a belief is merely the means of detecting a delusion
which may possibly prove to be an insane one. The error is
not the delusion. No erroneous belief can be said to be an
insane delusion if it might possibly be based on any kind of
reasoning whatever, no matter how wrong or unreasonable
that reasoning might be.
24
8. A person suffering from an insane delusion, whether such de-
lusion be permanent or intermittent, may make a will, and
the will is valid unless the delusion touches the property to be
bequeathed, the beneficiaries, or those to whom the property
would descend if the will were not made.2
5
D. Evidence and burden of proof of mental capacity.
i. The burden is on the proponent to prove all those facts which
are essential to entitle the will to probate and among these
facts is mental capacity.
2. But the presumption that all men are sane makes a prima facie
case without the introduction of any testimony.
26
FRAUD, UNDUE INFLUENCE AND MISTAKE
I. Fraud is any imposition, pretense, device, or false statement by which
the testator is induced to make a will in a way in which he did not
want to make it.27
'2Whipple v. Eddy, 161 Ill. 114, cited in 228 Ill. 380, 1ig Am. St. Rep. 442.
ACCORD-Chafin Will Case, 32 Wis 577; In re Smith, 52 Wis. 543, 38 Am. St.
Rep. 756.
"Riggs v. A.H.M., Soc. 35 Hun. (N.Y.) 656. This definition is criticized by
Rood in Section x26 et seq.
2'Medill vt. Snyder, 61 Kan. 15, 5 Prob. Rep. An. 216; Cole's Will, 49 Wis. x81;
Potter v. Jones, 20 Ore. 251, 12 L.R.A. i65.
Also see 5 Prob. Rep. An. 369, and 3 Prob. Rep. An i.
163 Am. St. Rep. 94; Anmer. Bible Soc. v. Price, 1i5 Ill. 623, Ann. Cas. i9i6C,
4-21; Ballantine vt. Proudfoot, 62 Wis. 216.
223 Mich. Law Rev. 422; Allen v. Grifflin, 69 Wis. 529. This is the weight of
authority some states holding, however, that the burden is on the contestant to
show incapacity, while still others hold that the proponent must produce positive
testimony that the testator was sane.
'Bigelow on Fraud, sec. 571, cited in Rood, 169.
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A. Fraud invalidates the will or that part of it which was fraudu-
lently obtained, whether such imposition relates to the subject
matter of the will or to the inducement which caused the testator
to make it.
2 8
B. The person benefited need not be a party to the fraud.2 9
C. There must be an intention to defraud. 30
D. The provision must have been caused or induced by the decep-
tion.3'
E. When a will has been probated without knowledge of a fraud
which had been perpetrated on the testator, the remedy is not
in a court of equity to avoid the will on account of fraud, but is
in a court of probate to have the decree of probate reopened.32
F. A person who has been deprived of a bequest because of the fraud
of a third person on the testator cannot have an action in tort
on account of the wrongdoing.33
II. Undue influence occurs where a situation is brought about in which
the testator is coerced into making a will against his will.
A. Coercion is a necessary element of undue influence. 34
B. The coercion must destroy the free agency of the testator.34
C. Such coercion may consist of physical violence, or threats, or
harassing importunings which the testator is too weak to resist,
or to which he submits in a desire to obtain peace.34
D. As undue influence usually operates artfully it cannot ordinarily
be shown directly but must arise from the facts and circum-
stances of each case. The points to be noted in a showing of
undue influence are: first, an unnatural result in the will; sec-
ond, a fit subject for the exercise of the influence; third, a per-
son who would have a motive for exercising it, and fourth, an
opportunity for the use of the unlawful influence.
E. But it is not the law that all influences are unlawful. There are
some appeals which may be legitimately addressed to the testa-
tor. Persuasion, arguments, appeals to sentiments of love and
gratitude for past services, or pity for future poverty, and the
=31 Am. St. 68o, as to heirs disinherited by fraud; 17 A.L.R. 239.
"Coghill v. Kennedy, iig Ala. 641.
Abbott, p. 261.
68 Am. Dec. I5O.
i8 Ann. Cas. 807, et seq.
18 L.R.A.N.S. 698-703; 31 L.R.A.N.S. 176-178; 41 L.R.A.N.S. 109; 12 Am.
St. 261
Rood, gecs., 175-191; 140 Wis. 291; 31 Am. St. Rep. 670-691; i6 Am. Dec.
257-263.
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like are proper unless they overwhelm the testator's will without
convincing his judgment. 5
F. The influence of a wife who has so captivated the affections and
confidence of her husband that he relies on her judgment and
good feeling to the extent, even, of making a will in her favor, to
the exclusion of the rest of the family, is not a ground for setting
aside the will as obtained by undue influence. 36
G. The same rule applies to a child who is benefited by a will on ac-
count of the trust and confidence which was reposed in him by
the parent.
37
H. Wills made to persons who have obtained a place in the affections
of the testator by reason of the kind and considerate treatment
which they gave to him are not subject to be attacked on the
ground of undue influence.38
I. Wills made depriving the natural beneficiaries of their expected
bequests and made under the spell of a hatred fostered by the
beneficiaries under the will cannot be denied probate on the
ground of undue influence unless the will does not express the
true wish of the testator. "
J. Wills made in favor of mistresses will not be avoided on the
ground of undue influence as long as they express the free desire
of the testator.40
K. A will procured by undue influence does not become valid by rea-
son of the subsequent ratification of the testator.4 1
L. If a will has been procured by the lawful argument or persuasion
of the beneficiary or someone in his interest it does not later
become void by reason of the testator regretting that he made it.42
M. Undue influence invalidates the whole will if the entire instru-
ment is the result of the unlawful imposition; but if only a part
of the will is the result of such means the rest of the instrument
must be admitted to probate.
N. Where a will makes a bequest in favor of one who stands in a
position of confidence to the testator the general rule is that there
is no presumption of undue influence if that beneficiary did not
"16 Am. Dec. 257; 31 Am. St. Rep. 678; 4 Am. St. 593; 82 Am. St. Rep. 8o9.
53 L.R.A. 387; Armstrong v. Armstrong, 63 Wis. 162; Deck v. Deck, io6
Wis. 47o; Ball v. Boston, 153 Wis. 27.
' Thompson v. Ish, 99 Mo. 16o, 17 Am. St. 552; In re Butler, 110 Wis. 70.
Riley v. Sherwood, 144 Mo. 354, 3 Prob. Rep. An. 519, (38).
" See note, 31 Am. St. Rep. 68o.
'Notes in 4 Prob. Rep. An. 75; 31 Am. St- Rep. 677; 16 A.L.R. 457.
' Rood, see. 185.
"'Deck v. Deck, lo6 Wis. 47o.
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prepare the will ;4 but if the confidant took part in the prepara-
tion of the will there may be a case for the jury.44
0. Undue influence cannot be presumed. The burden is on the
contestant to show it, and slight evidence will be sufficient on
the part of the contestant to give the case to the jury.4 '
III. Mistake.
A. Any provision in a will, which was induced by mistake, can be
corrected only when the mistake appears on the face of the will,
and when there appears on the face of the will what the pro-
vision would have been but for the mistake.4
6
B. A mistake as to an extrinsic or collateral fact will not invalidate
the instrument.
C. The words in the will must be the words of the testator and not
merely the inferences of others as to what the words were or
what their meaning was.
47
D. The general rule is that the written will is not to be altered or
explained by parol evidence. But this rule is excepted to in the
following cases. 8
i. Where a latent ambiguity arises outside the will and is brought
to the attention of the court by parol testimony it may be re-
moved by such testimony. A patent ambiguity in the will
itself may not be so explained.
2. Parol evidence may be admitted to rebut a resulting trust.
3. Parol evidence is admissible in case of fraud, to show the in-
strument void.
4. It may be shown that the testator thought he was executing
one instrument when in fact he was executing another. This
rule is also followed where the testator did not know he was
signing a will and did not intend it to operate as such.49
E. Where a technical or legal word is used in the will by the testator
or his agent or attorney evidence will not be admitted to show
that the testator meant otherwise, and the court will give effect
to the words as they are in the will."
Bancroft v. Otis, 9I Ala. 279, 24 Am. St. Rep. 9o4.
See notes in 71 Am. Dec. 129, 28 L.R.A.N.S. 270; Morgan's Will, 11O Wis. 7.
'5Derusseau's Will, 175 Wis. 140, 6 A.L.R. 1412; Baker v. Baker, 1O2 Wis.
226; Bryant v. Pierce, 95 Wis. 33i.
' Rood, 168; Gifford v. Dyer, 2 R.I. 99, 57 Am. Dec. 708.
,7 Waite v. Frisbie, 45 Minn. 361.
'Iddings v. Iddings, 7 Serg and 'R. (Penn.) iii, io Am. Dec. 450.
"i Mass. 258, 2 Am. Dec. 16.
o Mass. 477 at 488; Sherwood v. Sherwood, 45 Wis. 357.
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F. Where the testator reads the will or has it read to him he is pre-
sumed to know the contents of it and hence any omission not
clear from the face of the will does not constitute a mistake.5 '
G. The English rule is that words inserted in a will by mistake may
be stricken out but that words omitted by mistake may not be
supplied.5 2
H. In spite of the lack of American cases on the subject, the weight
of authority seems to follow the English rule."3
I. It is generally the rule by statute that if the name of a child is
omitted from a will by mistake the child shall take as if no will
had been made. 4 The Wisconsin statute makes the same pro-
vision for a child born after the will is made.54
J. There can be no relief in a court of equity to reform a will so that
it expresses the intention of the testator.53
WHO MAY TAKE BY WILL
I. In general a devise or bequest may be made to any person, unless
forbidden by express statute, or opposed to good morals, or op-
posed to public policy.56
II. Artificial persons may take by will; corporations are generally en-
abled to take; and public corporations are no exception to the
rule.57 Foreign corporations may take by devise or bequest except
where the devise is forbidden by the law of the state where the
land is situated.58 Corporations may take in trust.5 9
III. Married women, infants and insane persons, 0 and persons civilly
dead by reason of conviction for a felony who are serving sentence
" Mitchell v. Gard, 3 Sw. & Tr. 75, cited in Costigan's Cases, 56.
'In re Goods of Louis Schott, (igoi), p.I90.
'Patch v. White, 117 U.S. 210, 45 Wis. 257 and 45 Wis. 211 apparently contra.
In 165 Wis. 6oi the testatrix bequeathed all her property, 580 acres, Van
Buren Street, Milwaukee, to her sister. Court took testimony that she did not own
any other property but did own one half of a double house at 580 Van Buren Street,
and struck out the word acres.
See the authorities pro and contra in 6 L.R.A.N.S. 942; Wigniore on Evidence,
2477; 22 L.R.A.N.S. 450.
" These statutes are discussed in 39 Am. Dec. 740. Wisconsin Statutes
2286, 2287, 2288. The Wisconsin Statute seems to put the burden on the claimant
of showing that the omission was unintentional. See Moon v. Estate of Evans,
69 Wis. 667.
65 Am. St. Rep. 521, 50 Am. St. Rep. 283.
t'Rood, 192.
I Rood, 193, 197, 200.
1ii6 Ill. 375; 126 N.Y. 537.
t' Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U. S. 127.
io I Bigelow's Jarman, 75.
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at the time of the death of the testator, may take by devise or be-
quest.8 '
IV. Subscribing witnesses are generally forbidden by statute from
taking under the will.6 2
V. In general gifts in furtherance of illegal objects or immoral pur-
poses are void as against public policy.63
VI. Aliens may now receive by will. This is by statute. 4  But in the
interpretation of most forbidding statutes the gifts are held only
voidable.
WILLS DISTINGUISHED FROM CERTAIN OTHER DIS-
POSITIONS OF PROPERTY
I. From deeds.
A deed passes a present title; it is irrevocable unless such power is
reserved in the instrument; it must be executed and acknowl-
edged as prescribed by the statute; it takes effect upon delivery;
and is operative during the life of the grantor.
A will passes no present title; it must be executed and acknowledged
as prescribed by the statute; it is ambulatory and revocable
during the life of the testator and takes effect only upon his
death; and it need not be delivered.
If an instrument is clearly intended to be a will it must stand or fall
as such; if it is intended clearly to be a deed it must stand or
fall as a deed. If the intent is not clear it is a question for the
jury as to whether it is a will or a deed. 65
II. From gifts causa mortis.
A gift causa nortis resembles a will in that it is made in con-
templation of death; but it requires delivery, either actual or
symbolic, to pass title. It is revocable during the life of the
donor and is revoked by the recovery of the donor from the
sickness in which he made it. If once delivered it is not re-
vocable except by the recovery of the donor.66
69 Hun. 436.
'Wis. Stats. 2284 and 2285 provide that bequests to witnesses shall fail unless
there shall be two other competent subscribing witnesses; except that if the
persons witnessing would have taken under the laws of intestacy they may take
under the will.
'Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1917 as to bequests subversive of religion.
Ann. Cas. I917B as to bequests tending to separate husband and wife.
"Wis. Const. I, I5.
Sii Am. St. Rep. 28.
13 Allen (Mass.) 43.
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EXECUTION OF WRITTEN WILLS AND TESTAMENTS
I. The Wisconsin statute requires that no will shall be valid to pass title
to any real or personal estate (except such noncupative wills as are
excepted by the statute) unless the will shall be in writing, signed
by the testator, or by some other person in his presence and by his
express direction, and unless it shall be attested and subscribed in
the presence of the testator by two competent witnesses in the
presence of each other.6 7
II. In Wisconsin the testator need not sign in the presence of the wit-
nesses, but if he does not he mtlst acknowledge his signature by
some overt act. If he signs in their presence he need not inform
them of the contents of the instrument.
III. Some other person may sign for the testator in his presence and
by his express direction.
IV. The testator may sign by mark. The signature need not be the full
name of the testator spelled out. But the testator must intend to
sign by mark; to start to sign his name and then, by reason of
weakness, and so forth, leave it unfinished is. not a sufficient
signing.6 8
V. In the absence of a requirement in the statute that the will be
signed at the end, it is generally held that a signing any place in the
instrument is sufficient.69
VI. An attestation clause is not necessary since it neither adds to nor
detracts from the will.
VII. If another signs for the testator he may also sign by any mark or
writing which is approved by the testator, unless restricted by
statute.
VIII. The testator need not request the witness to attest and subscribe
the will; it is sufficient if the testator know the witness is signing
the will and that he acquiesce in the signing.
70
IX. What is meant'by the presence of the testator is a question of fact.
Most of the courts hold that presence means the ability of the
testator to see the signing without any pronounced change of posi-
tion.71 Ordinarily a signing in the same room with the testator is
presumed to be in his presence, and a signing out of the room is
out of his presence.7'
Wis. Stats. 282.
es22 L.R.A. 370; 31 A.L.R. 682; Knapp v. Rcilly, 3 Dem. Sur. 427.
929 L.R.A.N.S. 63; 29 A.L.R. 891.
Meure's Will, 44 Wis. 392, 28 Am. Rep. 591.
28 Am. Rep. 595; Dozwnies Will, 42 Wis. 66; 31 N.J. Ep. 242.
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X. A witness is competent under the statutes if he is able to testify in
court and understands the solemnity of the oath.
7 2
XI. The provision requiring that the will be in writing is satisfied if
the will is on a printed form, or if it is written in pencil, or type-
written.
7 3
XII. A will may be written on any material which is capable of retain-
ing the impression of the writing.
74
XIII. The requirements of the statute are fulfilled by a will written on
several disconected sheets of paper on only one of which the names
of the testator and the witnesses are affixed. 75  However, all the
sheets must be present when the will is signed.
XIV. The only exception to the rule that the whole will must be present
when it is signed occurs when independent documents are said to
be incorporated into the will by reference. To have a good incor-
poration by reference there must be the following essentials.
A. A clear, understandable reference which sufficiently identifies
the instrument to be incorporated.
B. The reference must be a present reference to an existing docu-
ment.
C. If the reference is in the present tense and then the document is
prepared, and later a codicil is made, the reference will be good.
But if the reference is in the future it is not good unless the later
codicil contains a perfect reference. 76
D. The documents sought to be incorporated into the will need not




I. Revocation of a will may take place in two ways.
A. By act of the testator.
i. A later writing.
a. A later will or codicil in which other and inconsistent pro-
visions are added to the former will amending it or revoking
it in part and affirming it.
b. A later will by which the former will is completely revoked
and displaced.
245 Am. St. Rep. 434; L.R.A. 19i6D, i79.
724 Am. Rep. 227; i9 Am. St. 637.
43o A.L.R. 424
'Rood, 248 and cases cited.
"'Rood, 25o and cases cited.
"'a Ann. Cas. i9i3D, 309.
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c. A revoking instrument which is not testamentary in character
but which is intended merely to annul the former will.
2. An act of destruction performed on the former will.
B. By operation of law.
This takes place only when the circumstances of the testator have
changed, such as by marriage and the birth of children.
II. Revocation by the act of the testator.
A. In order to have a good revocation by the act of the testator
there must be:
i. A doing by him or his agent in his presence and by his direction
of some act sufficient in law to revoke the will, and
2. Accompanying the act there must be an intention to have such
an act operate as a revocation.
B. The revocation of wills is entirely governed by statute.7 7
C. Section 2290, Wisconsin Statutes, provides that no will or any
part of a will may be revoked unless by burning, tearing, obliter-
ating the same, with an intention to revoke the same, by the
testator or by some one in his presence and by his direction, or
by some other will or codicil in writing, executed as prescribed
in the statute, or by some other writing, signed, attested and
subscribed in the manner provic,. i in this chapter for the execu-
tion of a will; except that nothins, in the section shall be taken to
prevent the revocation implied by law from the subsequent
changes in the conditions or circumstances of the testator. The
power to make a will implies the power to revoke the same. 7
D. A nuncupative will cannot convey property already provided for
in a written will.
7 8
E. It may be shown that the will was destroyed or revoked by mis-
take, accident or inadvertence., 9
F. An express clause of revocation will operate to revoke all former
wills even if for some reason the revoking will is inoperative.s0
G. In the absence of any express clause of revocation in a later will,
the general rule is that the former will is revoked by the latter
in so far as the latter is inconsistent with it."'
H. As to what is a complete destruction under the statute there can
be no set rule; but, in general, it may be said that the act of
destruction must be a completed act, in which there has been no
'Wis. Stats. 229o.
"
0Brooks v. Chappell, 34 Wis. 405.
See notes in L.R.A. i9i6C, ioi, and L.R.A. 1918A, 914.
80L.R.A. I9i6C ioi; 2o Ann. Cas. iooi.
Ann. Cas. 1914D. Apparently contra, In re Fisher, 4 Wis. 254.
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change of intention, or interference. 82  The will must have on
its face evidence of the act. It follows that a will which is
scorched but is still legible has been revoked. The same is true
of a will which is torn but still readable. A cancellation need
not obliterate the whole matter of the instrument. To write
across the will that it is cancelled is not a cancellation within the
meaning of the statute.
8 3
I. Presumptions as to revocation.
i. If it is shown that the testator made a will and later possessed
it, and, upon his death, the will is not found, or is found in a
mutilated condition, the presumption will arise that the tes-
tator destroyed the will with an intention of revoking it.84
This presumption may be confirmed by declarations of the
testator that the will was revoked.85
2. If the will was made and after the death of the testator is not
found, the presumption as to revocation will not arise if it is
shown that the will was accessible to someone who would have
had the desire to destroy it.
3. The doing of what the statute prescribes is prima facie evidence
of an intention to revoke, but this is rebuttable8 6
III. Revocation by operation of law.
A. At common law the marriage of a woman was a sufficient change
of circumstances but under the married women's enabling acts
it is generally held that marriage alone is not sufficient to revoke
a will made before it.87
B. An ordinary change of financial circumstances will not revoke a
will, nor will the ordinary change of relationship, except as pro-
vided by statute. In Wisconsin neither the marriage nor the
birth of issue will alone revoke the will, but together they will
revoke the will, both as to males and females. 8Ta
C. In Wisconsin it is provided that afterborn children shall take as
if there was no will.88
D. A divorce and a complete property settlement will act as a revo-
cation of a will made by the divorcee.8 9
"=Rood, 342-354.
'Ladd's Will, 6o Wis. 187.
Valentine's Will, 93 Wis. 45.
M2o Ann. Cas. 214.
': Will of Lyons, 96 Wis. 339.
'3 Will of Lyons, 96 Wis. 339.
'Wis. Stats. 2286.
s143 Wis. 234 and i56 Wis. 517. See Note 9 MARQUETE L. REV. 208.
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E. In Wisconsin there is no way in which a man can bar his wife's
dower by will.
F. In Wisconsin marriage and adoption of a child will act as a revo-
cation of a willY0
IV. In Wisconsin the clause of revocation operates as soon as it is
executed.
V. In Wisconsin a will once revoked is forever revoked and the de-
struction of a later will does not operate as a revocation of a
former will. In order to revive such a former will it must be re-
executed or re-adopted in accordance with the statute. The mere
filing of a former will with the county judge will not revive the
sameY'
' Glascott v. Bragg, ii Wis. 605.
91"n re Noorn's Will, 115 Wis. 299.
